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Executive Summary 
Norway has been a prominent supporter of the UN’s Integrated Ap-
proach and has actively contributed to the development of NATO’s 
Comprehensive Approach. Norway’s own whole-of-government ap-
proach has, however, been limited to its engagement with Afghani-
stan.  
 
There is already a growing body of literature on the whole-of-
government approach. Surprisingly little has been written about Nor-
way in this context. This report represents a first attempt at compre-
hensively explaining the Norwegian whole-of-government approach, 
as well as and analyzing its effectiveness to date. 
 
In order to establish the basis for a comparative analysis, the first part 
of the report provides a brief introduction to the history of the whole-
of-government approach. Amongst others, the report features short 
discussions of the approaches followed by Canada, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The second part of the report exam-
ines Norway’s whole-of-government approach within the Norwegian 
foreign and defence policy contexts. The report then explains the 
Norwegian approach as it applies to Afghanistan in general, and to the 
Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team in particular. The third 
part is a comparative analysis of the Norwegian approach, where the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Norwegian model is considered by 
contrasting it against some of the other country experiences intro-
duced in part one.  
 
The rationale for a national whole-of-government approach is greater 
effectiveness. It is driven by the assumption that a government’s for-
eign engagements will have a more meaningful and sustainable impact 
when the various government departments involved pursue a common 
strategy, have a shared understanding of the problem, a common the-
ory of change, and an agreed plan for implementing such a strategy. 
 
We have found that Norway lacks a comprehensive strategy for en-
gaging in fragile states in general, as well as a whole-of-government 
strategy for any particular country, including Afghanistan. The report 
recommends that Norway consider adopting a law, or high-level pol-
icy document, that make it a requirement for Norway to have a na-
tional whole-of-government policy towards every country where it is 
engaged in initiatives related to peacekeeping, peacebuilding or con-
flict resolution. 
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The report recommends that such Norwegian whole-of-government 
strategies be limited to the higher strategic level. This will provide 
space for operational and tactical flexibility so that the Norwegian go-
vernment can pursue coherence with local and international strategic 
frameworks, while also remaining flexible to changes in the situation 
on the ground.  
 
The report express concern about the negative effects a Norwegian 
whole-of-government approach might have on the special relationship 
between the Norwegian government and Norwegian civil society. The 
report recommends that a forum be established where Norwegian civil 
society and government can regularly engage each other on issues re-
lated to the country’s international engagements, and its whole-of-
government approach.  
 
There is a significant fissure between policy commitments to an inte-
grated or comprehensive approach, and the challenges of navigating 
the real-world dilemmas that decision-makers face when trying to co-
ordinate multiple independent agencies. Despite the significant policy-
level initiatives undertaken internationally, and in Norway, to facili-
tate an integrated or comprehensive approach, this coherence dilemma 
remains characteristic – not only of Norway’s engagements – but in-
deed of most peace, stability and reconstruction operations today.
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1. Introduction  
Peace and stability operations are managed more effectively when the 
interdependency and interconnectedness of the political, security, 
governance and development dimensions of these operations are rec-
ognized. On this point there is broad consensus, both internationally 
and in Norway. Various models have been developed, including the 
Integrated Approach and Integrated Missions concepts by the United 
Nations  (see for instance Eide et al., 2005; de Coning, 2008), the 
Comprehensive Approach by the European Union (see Gross, 2008) 
and NATO (see Jakobsen, 2008), the Effects-Based Approach to Op-
erations (EBAO) among NATO member states, including the United 
States (see NATO, 2007a & 2007b; Mann & Endersby, 2002; MNE, 
2008), and a range of Whole-of-Government approaches, of which the 
best known is probably the original Canadian 3D (Diplomacy, Devel-
opment and Defence) concept (see Patrick & Brown, 2007; 
OECD/DAC, 2006).  
 
Norway has been a leading proponent of the UN integrated approach 
and an active supporter of NATO efforts to develop a comprehensive 
approach, including in Afghanistan where Norway leads a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT). It would thus only be natural that others 
should expect Norway to have an advanced approach to integration, 
and that the international community would be interested in how 
Norway manages its own whole-of-government approach. It may 
seem odd, however, that many studies and reports that compare differ-
ent whole-of-government approaches do not deal with the Norwegian 
model.1 One reason could be that surprisingly little has been written 
about this, whether by the Norwegian government itself, or by the re-
search community. It may well be the lack of available data that has 
resulted in Norway not being covered to the same extent as Sweden, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada and others.  
 
This report aims to address this shortcoming by describing how the 
Norwegian whole-of-government approach works, and by making a 
                                                 
 The authors would like to express appreciation to all the respondents who granted insights 
and views, both in Norway and Afghanistan, as well as the Ministry of Defence for fund-
ing the research. The authors are all associated with the Department for Security and Con-
flict Management at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). 
 
1  Neither of two of the most comprehensive and authoritative reviews (Patrick & Brown, 
Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing the ‘Whole of Government’ Approaches to 
Fragile States, (2007), and the 2007 OECD/DAC report on Whole of Government Ap-
proaches to Fragile States)  includes Norway. The countries covered by the studies are 
(those in bold are dealt with in both studies): Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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first attempt at analysing its effectiveness. Norway’s approach has 
been shaped by its intervention in Afghanistan – still the only inter-
vention to which the model has been applied. It is thus natural for this 
study to focus extensively on how the Norwegian model has been ap-
plied in the context of Afghanistan. 
 
Greater effectiveness is the rationale for a national whole-of-
government approach. It is driven by the assumption that a govern-
ment’s foreign engagements will have a more meaningful and sustain-
able impact when the various government departments involved in 
such an intervention pursue a common strategy, have a shared under-
standing of the problem, a common theory of change, and an agreed 
plan for implementing such a strategy. Such an approach should result 
in more efficient use of the resources made available by the govern-
ment, regardless of the department or ministry through which those 
resources are channelled (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008:4). This rationale is 
extended from the national to the international context, or vice versa, 
and the logic is that the greater the coherence achieved among the dif-
ferent parts of the system, the more meaningful, effective and sustain-
able is the overall impact likely to be (de Coning, 2007:14). 
 
In the first section, we introduce the whole-of-government approach. 
We consider the experiences of Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, using these cases as a comparative base against 
which we analyse the Norwegian model in the final section. In the 
second section, we consider Norway’s whole-of-government ap-
proach. We contextualize the Norwegian model within its larger for-
eign and defence policy domain, and discuss the workings of the 
model itself. We then proceed to consider how the model has been 
applied in Afghanistan in general, and in the context of the Norwegian 
PRT in particular. In the third section we analyse the performance of 
the Norwegian model and compare it to the other international models 
discussed in section one. We conclude with a summary of the findings 
of this study and several recommendations on how Norway could con-
sider improving its whole-of-government approach.  
2. The Whole- of-Government  
Approach 
Our understanding of international conflict management has become 
more subtle and nuanced, especially in the context of the lessons 
learned from the major systemic failures of the international interven-
tions in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica. It is now widely recog-
nized, for instance in the highest-level policy statements of the United 
Nations, European Union and NATO, that managing conflict requires 
a multi-dimensional, comprehensive, system-wide or integrated ap-
proach. For instance: UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, referring to 
Afghanistan, has argued that what is needed is a ‘comprehensive ap-
proach including better governance, economic development such as a 
single financing mechanism, and when necessary appropriate military 
pressure’.2 Similarly, the new NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, has stated that ‘we need a comprehensive approach, a re-
inforced interaction between our military efforts and our endeavours 
with regard to civil reconstruction.’3 And Norway’s Foreign Minister, 
Jonas Gahr Støre, has recently declared: ‘Decades of experience have 
taught us this lesson: We need a comprehensive, multidimensional 
approach to peacekeeping: stronger emphasis on human security; bet-
ter recognition of the links between security and development…’.4 
One-dimensional or single-facet conflict management responses are 
now viewed as superficial and counterproductive, in that they address 
only some aspects of a wider system, and this tends to distort, shift or 
re-direct tensions in the system, rather than dealing with the root 
causes of the conflict in a coherent or comprehensive manner (de Con-
ing, 2007:3). 
 
The search for a more comprehensive or integrated approach should 
be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interde-
pendent international conflict management system. Since the early 
1990s, the scope of the crises facing the international community is 
often of such a scale that no single agency, government or interna-
tional organization can manage single-handed. In response, a wide 
                                                 
2  Gordon Brown Welcomes Pakistan’s President to Downing Street, Downing Street Press 
Release 28 August 2009,  
http://ukingeorgia.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/?view=News&id=20783367, accessed on 14 
September 2009. 
3  First NATO Press Conference, 3 August 2009,  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56776.htm, accessed on 14 September 
2009. 
4  Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, keynote speech delivered at 
NUPI on 6 October 2009 at a seminar on Violence and Protection in Africa. 
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range of agencies, governmental and non-governmental, and regional 
and international organizations have begun to develop specialized ca-
pacities aimed at managing different aspects of these emergencies. 
Together they have indeed succeeded in responding with a broad 
range of interlinked activities (de Coning, in Friis & Jarmyr, 2008:2). 
 
This multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary response has been able 
to deal with some of the highly dynamic crisis environments reasona-
bly well. In others, however, the degree to which the international 
conflict management system lacks coherence among the diverse inter-
national and local actors that make up the system has resulted in, inter 
alia, interagency rivalry, working at cross-purposes, competition for 
funding, duplication of effort and sub-optimal economies of scale 
(Fukuyama, 2004:40). All of these, taken together, have contributed to 
an overall poor success rate, measured in the sustainability of the sys-
tems that have emerged as a result of these international interventions. 
Research undertaken by Collier and colleagues (2003) has indicated 
that approximately half of all peace processes relapse within five 
years.5  
 
In order to address these shortcomings and improve the overall suc-
cess rate of the international conflict management system, various 
agencies, governments and organizations have started exploring, inde-
pendently of each other, a range of models and mechanisms aimed at 
improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of 
their conflict management systems. All these initiatives have a similar 
aim: to achieve greater harmonization and synchronization among the 
activities of the different international and local actors, and across the 
analysis, planning, implementation, management and evaluation as-
pects of the programme cycle. The goal is to bridge the security–
development divide and to integrate the political, security, governance 
and development dimensions in order to ensure a system-wide re-
sponse to any specific conflict system.  
 
At the national level, several governments have been experimenting 
with improving the cooperation among their own ministries or de-
partments, with a view to improving the management of various na-
tional challenges, but also specifically in the context of international 
operations. Such initiatives are now referred to as a whole-of-
government approaches. We will summarize the experiences of Can-
ada, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, in order to 
develop a comparative base against which we can later compare the 
Norwegian approach. 
                                                 
5  See Collier et al., (2003), but note that the 50% relapse figure has been questioned by 
Suhrke & Samset, (2007), who argue that the Collier et al. finding is closer to 25%. 
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2.1 Canada 
The Canadian government may not have been the first to develop a 
whole-of-government approach, but it was behind the ‘3D’ (diplo-
macy, development and defence) concept, which has so succinctly 
captured the essence of the whole-of-government approach that it has 
become the most widely known shorthand for the whole-of-
government approach. Canada has refined its original 3D concept and 
revised it in its interdepartmental ‘International Policy Statement’ of 
2005.  
 
In Canada, the Privy Council Office is responsible for ensuring that 
the Prime Minister’s policies are reflected in the work of the cabinet 
and the civil service, and it thus performs a critical coordination role 
in government. The Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee 
is responsible for international policy coordination. Policy coordina-
tion among departments and agencies takes place through interde-
partmental committees, working groups and task forces (OECD, 
2007b:51).   
 
A new permanent interagency body, the ‘Stabilization and Recon-
struction Task Force’ (START), was established in September 2005, 
within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT), mandated to coordinate interagency activities in conflict 
prevention, disaster response and post-conflict reconstruction (Patrick 
& Brown, 2007:56). START has an approved personnel roster of 75 
personnel and its own fund, the Global Peace and Security Fund 
(GPSF), with an allocation of approximately C$100million per year 
(Patrick & Brown, 2007:66). It has an interdepartmental Advisory 
Board that provides guidance; although it has some working-level 
staff from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
and the Department of National Defence (DND), the management is 
provided by DFAIT (OECD, 2007b:51). An important initiative 
launched in 2007 requires Canada’s embassies to lead an interdepart-
mental process aimed at developing an annual country engagement 
strategy, and this commitment is linked to the Ambassador’s ‘Per-
formance Management Agreement’ to ensure that there is an incentive 
for integration (OECD, 2007b:51).  
 
The Canadian military uses the concepts ‘Joint Interagency Multina-
tional and Public’ (JIMP) and ‘Civil–Military Coordination’ (CIMIC) 
to ensure that an integrated approach is ingrained among its members 
deployed to international missions (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008:123). 
Through START and other decision-making mechanisms, Canada has 
made concerted efforts to pursue a whole-of-government approach in 
its engagements, especially those with Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan. 
It has also played an active role in promoting an integrated approach 
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in multilateral forums such as the OECD and the UN (Patrick & 
Brown, 2007:57).  
 
Despite these policy commitments, coordination processes and the 
establishment of START, Patrick & Brown (2007:57) find that Can-
ada ‘continues to struggle in achieving cross-departmental agreement 
on objectives and motivations for its interventions, as well as for de-
signing and implementing country strategies.’ START is sometimes 
viewed as being in competition with the line-function departments, 
which have ministerial authority, both in terms of formulating policy 
and directing funding. There is a danger that START may undermine 
coherence by sponsoring short-term stabilization initiatives that do not 
fit broader, longer-term funding commitments to institution-building 
(OECD, 2007b:51). Despite the policy commitment and the creation 
of START there seem to be insufficient incentives for departments to 
break out of their natural self-promoting and self-protecting bureau-
cratic behaviour, and insufficient professional rewards for individuals 
to make the effort to overcome the constraints of these departmental 
cultures. In addition, even when there is the will to do so, there is of-
ten not enough time for interdepartmental consultation and planning. 
The overall result is that, although whole-of-government integration in 
Canada is better today than it was before 2005, the system is still far 
less coherent and integrated than envisioned in the International Pol-
icy Statement (Patrick & Brown, 2007:57). 
2.2 The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, coordination at the highest level takes place in the 
Council of Ministers, the Coordination Commission for International 
Affairs and the Cabinet Committee on European and International Af-
fairs. There are coordination mechanisms in place for dealing specifi-
cally with the implementation of whole-of-government policies; these 
include the Steering Committee for Security Cooperation and Recon-
struction, the Stability Fund (SF) Steering Committee, the Steering 
Committee for Military Operations, the Steering Committees on Po-
lice and Rule of Law, and the interministerial consultation committee 
on Civil–Military Cooperation (OECD, 2007:52). Many of the com-
mittees are chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and co-chaired 
by the Ministry of Defence or other relevant ministries. Additional 
mechanisms have been established in some country-specific cases. In 
the case of Sudan, for instance, a temporary task force has been estab-
lished in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, comprising the Africa De-
partment, the Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department, the Secu-
rity Policy Department and the Humanitarian Aid Division. The Sudan 
Task Force meets on a weekly basis. The Ministry of Defence attends 
regularly, and other departments join on an ‘as needed’ basis (OECD, 
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2007:52). The Sudan Task Force is responsible for policy formulation 
and implementation, and functions as a cross-departmental integrator, 
with direct links to the embassy in Khartoum, a Special Envoy for Su-
dan engaged in the Darfur talks and the top leadership in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.   
2.3 Sweden 
In Sweden, interdepartmental coherence and coordination in the con-
text of a whole-of-government approach to international interventions 
is promoted at the macro-policy level by the Policy on Global Devel-
opment (PGD, adopted in 2003), and at the implementation level with 
the Joint Preparation Process, which is required by law (OECD, 
2007:53).  Under the auspices of the PGD, which is a policy aimed at 
fighting poverty by promoting coherence, discussions take place 
among the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Justice, as well 
as the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Swed-
ish Rescue Services Agency and all other relevant agencies, with a 
view to jointly generating a multi-year Development Cooperation 
Strategy for each country that Sweden has a specific aid relationship 
with (Patrick & Brown, 2007:121). However, the OECD study has 
found that this process lacks a joint assessment component, and this 
often results in the various ministries contributing what they have to 
offer, instead of applying a demand-based approach to formulating 
strategy (OECD, 2007:53).  
 
As a result of the PGD, Sweden’s whole-of-government approach dif-
fers from most other models. It is not focused solely on international 
peace and security interventions, nor is it limited to engagement with 
fragile states, but encompasses the country’s entire international coop-
eration and development policy. In addition, Sweden adopted a Na-
tional Strategy for Swedish Participation in International Peace Sup-
port and Security Building Operations in March 2008, aimed specifi-
cally at increasing Swedish engagement in such operations, and in an 
integrated and combined way (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008:173). It is 
important to note, however, that Sweden’s foreign policy directs the 
country to engage in international interventions in a multilateral con-
text. In that context, the Swedish approach is to work ‘through the EU 
to formulate a more coherent EU-wide development policy frame-
work, including common country strategies and harmonized aid in-
struments and mechanisms’ (Patrick & Brown, 2007: 116).  
 
Recent examples of Swedish interventions that include the military are 
Sweden’s engagements in Liberia and Afghanistan. In Liberia, it con-
tributed a unit to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and develop-
ment assistance through SIDA, as well as engaging politically through 
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a special envoy. A Swedish lessons-learned study found that Sweden 
‘needs much better inter-ministerial coordination to ensure greater 
alignment of planning, objectives, and resources, as well as between 
military resources and foreign aid instruments’ (Patrick & Brown, 
2007:124). In Afghanistan, the Swedish-led PRT in Mazar-e Sharif 
includes, in addition to the military component, a political advisor 
from the Foreign Ministry, a development advisor from SIDA, and an 
advisor from the Swedish Police Board (Patrick & Brown, 2007:124). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for interagency coordi-
nation for international interventions; this coordination takes place at 
four levels: the ministerial, state secretary (deputy minister), policy 
director and desk officer levels.  
 
According to Patrick & Brown (2007:119) Sweden’s consensual po-
litical culture, regular communication, mutual understanding and the 
modest size (especially of the Ministry of Defence) has created a 
situation where there is no need for new standing units to facilitate a 
whole-of-government approach. However, tensions do exist, espe-
cially between SIDA and the Foreign Ministry on the use of aid to 
achieve political aims rather than poverty alleviation (Patrick & 
Brown, 2007:119).  
2.4 The United Kingdom 
The UK government’s ‘joined-up’ approach, initiated under the Blair 
administration, is a leading example of the emergence of the trend to-
wards a whole-of-government approach at the national level. The 
Cabinet Office ensures that the Prime Minister and government’s stra-
tegic and foreign policy objectives are implemented in a coordinated 
way. Under the Cabinet Office, the Ministerial Committee on National 
Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) provides 
part of the overarching structure and direction that guides the work of 
the different departments (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008:196). At the in-
terdepartmental level, various cross-cutting groups facilitate policy 
coherence, among them the Afghan Strategy Group, the Sudan Unit 
and the Afghan Drugs Interdepartmental Unit.  
 
In the UK, the government created a specialized interagency unit re-
sponsible for facilitating its whole-of-government approach in 2004. It 
was first called the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), re-
named the Stabilization Unit in 2008. It brings together the Ministry 
of Defence, the Department for International Development (DFID) 
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A key feature of the UK 
model is the creation of joint funding pools (OECD, 2007:54). These 
include the Stabilization Aid Fund, which is a pool amounting to GDP 
269 million, jointly owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
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DFID and the Ministry of Defence and managed by the Stabilization 
Unit; and the Conflict Prevention Pool, worth GDP 327 million over 
three years (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008:197).  In addition, the Stabiliza-
tion Unit and the relevant departments are engaged in various efforts 
aimed at developing common concepts, policies, doctrines and tools. 
These initiatives have helped to promote the establishment of a greater 
sense of shared purpose among the departments.  
 
The UK’s overall whole-of-government approach to international in-
terventions is directed by the National Security Strategy of March 
2008, which is explicitly committed to an integrated civil–military ap-
proach. Specific campaigns also have their own strategies.  However, 
Patrick & Brown (2007:10) found that, despite impressive efforts and 
innovations, effective whole-of-government approaches have re-
mained elusive, ‘hampered not only by conflicting mandates and cul-
tures, but also by the lack of underlying consensus among departments 
on national objectives and the means to achieve them. The UK’s re-
cord suggests that improved communication, common resource pools, 
and coordination mechanisms can improve policy response, but are no 
substitute for a clear, agreed-upon strategic framework reflecting 
common priorities.’ 

3. Norway’s Whole-of-Government 
Approach 
In order to understand the whole-of-government approach adopted by 
Norway, one needs to understand the developments that have shaped 
Norway’s foreign and defence policies, as well as the unique role of 
Norwegian civil society. Each of these contexts will be explored in the 
next section. Thereafter we present in greater detail the Norwegian 
approach to Afghanistan – the only case in which a formal Norwegian 
whole-of-government approach has been applied.6 The way in which 
it has been organized will be analysed on the strategic (Oslo), opera-
tional (Kabul) and tactical (Faryab) levels.  
3.1 The Norwegian Foreign Policy Context 
According to Thune and Ulriksen (2002:7), there are three ways in 
which one can frame Norwegian foreign policy: essentialism, struc-
turalism and pragmatism. The essentialist position holds that the na-
tion’s experiences (or its ‘national essence’) have been the major fac-
tor in shaping its foreign policy: in other words, there are aspects of 
Norwegian culture, shaped by its unique history, that inform the coun-
try’s national and international policies. The structuralist position sees 
Norwegian foreign policy as a function of Norway’s position in rela-
tion to others in the international community. This position is based on 
Norway’s alliances and geopolitical positioning, and on its interests 
and values in the context of changes in the structure of international 
relations. Thune and Ulriksen  go on to argue that neither the essen-
tialist nor the structural frames can adequately explain Norway’s for-
eign policy choices. In their view, Norwegian foreign policy can best 
be understood as a product of ‘pragmatic idealism’, which is based on 
the desire to ‘maximize international influence’.  
 
To a small country with limited resources like Norway, a whole-of-
government approach will necessarily mean something other than for 
a big country with greater foreign policy ‘reach’. The peculiar devel-
opment of the international involvement in Afghanistan has, however, 
put Norway in a role where it might be able to play the part of a nor-
mally much bigger bilateral or multilateral actor. For the northwestern 
                                                 
6  Although a latecomer to whole-of-government approach, Norway has applied it in domes-
tic reforms such as the merger of the unemployment service, the national pension and in-
surance system, and the social services in 2006 into what is now called NAV(Christensen 
& Lægreid 2006:13). 
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Afghan province of Faryab – with around a million inhabitants – 
some, both Norwegians and others, do have the expectation (or ambi-
tion) that Norway as the lead NATO nation in the area could play the 
coordinating and indeed decisive international role normally expected 
of the United Nations. Faryab is a miniature playing ground where 
Norway could act out some whole-of-government traits – if it so 
wished. As we will see, there are several strains in Norway’s foreign 
and defence policy doctrines that militate against it assuming such a 
role. However, the PRT concept is a tactical whole-of-government 
application, and in the absence of other actors like the UN, Norway is, 
by default, contributing to the comprehensiveness and coherence of 
the international effort and its relations with local Afghan institutions 
in Faryab.  
 
The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) has 
been present with only one or two staff members in Faryab. For a long 
time, only a local staff member was posted there. A few international 
NGOs have also been present, and on the police side the USA has 
been doing some training and mentoring. But the only actor with a 
comprehensive range of resources across the political, development, 
police and military dimensions has been Norway. 
 
Such a unilateral approach is – in foreign policy terms – almost in-
stinctively abhorrent to Norwegians. An early saying after Norway 
gained its independence in 1905 was: ‘the best foreign policy is to 
have no foreign policy’.7 Norway remained neutral during the First 
World War, but its non-foreign policy ambitions had their clear limita-
tions. In 1940, Norway was occupied by Nazi Germany. Both militar-
ily and economically, Norway’s dependence on the United States was 
overwhelming after the Second World War, because of Norway’s 
common border with Russia and the strategic waterways in the north. 
Some debate ensued in the postwar years, but Norway was firmly 
steered into NATO in 1949 by its dominant Labour Party.8 By multi-
lateralizing at least some of its relations with the USA within the 
NATO umbrella, Norway could to mitigate the unequal power rela-
tions to some extent.  
 
The Norwegian foreign policy elite after the Second World War were 
not acting rashly. They saw Norway as surrounded by stronger powers 
in a Hobbesian world of international anarchy. Its territorial waters 
were highly attractive; and in any bilateral competition, Norway 
                                                 
7  This was also stated by the first Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jørgen Løvland, 
in 1905 
8  The increasingly polarized postwar situation between East and West forced Prime Minis-
ter Einar Gerhardsen to take sides in security and foreign politics. Gerhardsen was sup-
ported by the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament), where there were only 13 votes 
against Norway’s joining NATO, which also formalized the relationship with the USA 
and the ‘Western’ world.  
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would lose out if it had no allies, or if contentious issues could not be 
resolved within a framework of international law and multilateral in-
stitutions based on the nation state as the principal, sovereign and 
equal unit.9 It was only natural that Norway should become a firm ad-
herent of the UN and of all kinds of international bodies and regula-
tions, with a few exceptions. Most notably, Norwegians have twice 
voted against joining what is today the EU, but that does not constitute 
an anomaly. Joining the EU, as it has been framed in the Norwegian 
debate, would be about losing national sovereignty. In that sense, fears 
revolved on how Norway’s small population would drown in a big 
Europe, whereas in NATO and the UN each state has more or less the 
same influence, no matter the size of its population. Or, at least, such 
equality is enshrined in the founding documents, although in practice 
other factors serve to make some states more powerful than others.10 
On the other hand, despite formally standing outside the EU, Norway 
has been one of the most active states in adapting to its regulations, 
and has sought whenever possible to participate in EU European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions in the Balkans as well as in 
Africa. 
 
Thus, acting alone is something that is done only in exceptional cases 
– as in certain peace negotiations, where Norway’s unique image and 
non-threatening posture has given it a comparative advantage. The 
motivation here has often been one of ‘maximizing international in-
fluence’, combined with altruism. An important point for Norway is 
further to maximize this influence mainly within a multilateral frame-
work. Negotiating peace also fits well with the perceptions many 
Norwegians have of their country. Norway as an international peace-
maker is a win–win situation. However, acting as a muscular arbiter in 
the distant province of Faryab is much harder to reconcile with Nor-
wegian self-perceptions. Norway’s role there would more readily ap-
pear to be one of supplanting a multilateral institution (i.e. the UN) 
and not complementing it. 
3.2 Norwegian Defence Policy Context 
Norway, along with the other Nordic countries, was among the major 
troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations until the early 
1990s. All the same, such military contributions were marginal to the 
Norwegian armed forces, in terms of doctrine, structure and indeed as 
a part of the forces’ raison d’être. The Norwegian military identity, or 
defence tradition, was built on a vision of the armed forces as repre-
                                                 
9  As such, the UN, NATO, EU and the relationship with the USA have in many ways 
served as defining parameters for Norwegian foreign policy. (See for instance Leira et al., 
2007:39; Neumann, 2003; Egeland 1988.)  
10  The UN Security Council with its five veto powers is such an apparent factor of inequality 
within the United Nations. 
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senting the nation in the defence of the homeland (Græger 2007 & 
2009, Ulriksen, 2002). Operations abroad were only marginal to this 
identity and role. Indeed, Norwegian military history since the 17th 
century was systematically presented as defence of Norwegian terri-
tory and autonomy. Participation in operations abroad was rarely men-
tioned in the literature.   
 
Service in UN peacekeeping operations was not considered important 
or particularly helpful for the career of professional officers in the 
Norwegian army until around 1995, when NATO’s SFOR relieved the 
UN’s UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This shift in the 
emphasis put on missions abroad came about partly because SFOR 
was a NATO operation and not a UN-led force. Whereas UN opera-
tions were seen as being about politics and peace, NATO operations 
had the prestige of being ‘real soldiering’.  
 
In 1998, Norway withdrew from the UN peacekeeping mission in 
Lebanon after 30 years. Eleven years were to pass before Norway re-
turned to UN peacekeeping – as of 2009, Norway is contributing a 
field hospital to the UN mission in Chad (MINURCAT). The decision 
to stop contributing troops to the UN mission in Lebanon was made 
after a bitter struggle between the Ministry of Defence and the armed 
forces on one side, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the other. 
At issue was the control of Norwegian military participation in inter-
national operations (Ulriksen, 2007a). In 2002, a major structural 
change in practice converted the defining tasks of the Norwegian 
armed forces from territorial defence to contributions to NATO opera-
tions abroad (Ulriksen, 2007b). 
 
Norwegian participation in UN peacekeeping operations was ap-
plauded as a ‘citizen in uniform’ approach that combined military and 
civilian skills and attitudes. The troops, former conscripts, were 
drafted from the reserves and included trained craftsmen and experi-
enced men (troops were mostly male) from many civilian professions. 
In a sense, these units were ideal for the Lebanon-type peacekeeping 
operations where the military, apart from ceasefire observation and 
patrolling, mainly supported community development.  Troops were 
given only a few weeks of military refresher training prior to deploy-
ment, and were thus not trained as coherent military fighting units – 
that was not their mandated task. Nor was it conceivable within the 
geo-political context at that time that the mandate of UNMIL would 
suddenly change. 
 
Since 1995, and especially since 2001/2002, Norway has increasingly 
deployed combat-ready military units prepared for battle.  This has 
been paralleled by greatly heightened military professionalism in the 
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armed forces. Norwegian armed forces rarely undertake community 
development or Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) projects now: 
indeed, they are more or less forbidden to do tasks defined as ‘civil-
ian’. The diversified skills and the perhaps more easygoing nature of 
the ‘citizen in uniform’ forces have been replaced by a strong focus on 
highly specialized security and combat skills.  Such a transformation 
may have been both unavoidable and necessary, given the greater risk 
and far more frequent combat involved in current operations, for in-
stance as part of the International Stabilization Force (ISAF) in Af-
ghanistan. 
 
The Norwegian military’s own preference for concentrating on purely 
military tasks has fitted well with the growing emphasis internation-
ally on protecting humanitarian space and de-linking the military from 
activities that can be confused with humanitarian action. At any rate, 
whatever the direct causes, the Norwegian armed forces no longer 
have the dedicated capability nor do they desire mandates that require 
them to undertake or support humanitarian, governance or develop-
ment tasks. The Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan, for instance, works 
for co-located, and at best loosely coordinated, civil–military rela-
tions, rather than integrated civil and military operations. Norway’s 
whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan thus needs to be un-
derstood, from a Norwegian military perspective at least, as an alter-
native to the old approach to CIMIC, where the military was directly 
involved in community development initiatives. The new Norwegian 
approach has conceptualized military and civilian agencies as working 
side by side, each in its own distinct professional role, but together 
contributing to a comprehensive approach to the overall objectives of 
the mission. At least, that was the idea. 
3.3 The Role of Civil Society in Norway’s Foreign  
Policy, Development and Humanitarian Interventions 
Norway has developed an informal and flexible cooperation model 
between state and non-state actors. This is especially the case in the 
development and humanitarian context, where the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, research institutions and non-governmental aid organizations 
cooperate in a symbiotic relationship as extensions of Norwegian in-
fluence (Tvedt, 2003). Similar descriptions can be made of state and 
non-state collaboration in other Nordic countries, but Norway in par-
ticular has become identified with this model. This is due to the inten-
tionality and normative character this relationship has come to repre-
sent, as well as the scope and influence of Norway in especially the 
humanitarian and development world, thanks to its sizeable ‘funding 
footprint’. In addition to the close cooperation between authorities, 
development and humanitarian NGOs, and academic institutions, this 
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unique relationship is also characterized by small-state advantages, 
and a long-term perspective (Norwegian MFA, 2008). The first com-
ponent – the close cooperation between civil society and the Norwe-
gian government – is highlighted as the main advantage of this special 
relationship.  
 
What then is the role of Norwegian civil society in the country’s 
whole-of-government approach? One argument is that the two ap-
proaches involve different levels: the whole-of-government approach 
is about harmonizing the various policies and approaches of govern-
ment departments and agencies, while the special relationship with 
civil society has focused on leveraging the role of Norwegian NGOs 
and academic institutions in the execution of policy. This does not 
mean that Norwegian civil society has no role to play in influencing 
government policy, but rather that this does not take place by formally 
incorporating civil society into governmental coordination mecha-
nisms.   
 
One aspect that needs special consideration concerns the implications 
of the fact that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made it 
an explicit goal and policy to make use of Norwegian NGOs, often as 
implementing partners in the development, humanitarian, research and 
capacity building fields, in its foreign policy actions. In a political and 
security-oriented whole-of-government context, as in Afghanistan, 
this may result in Norwegian non-governmental partners being per-
ceived as being an integral part of, or at least indirectly serving, the 
same goals as those identified and pursued through the Norwegian 
whole-of-government approach.  
 
This special relationship between civil society and the government has 
developed in the context of many development, humanitarian, re-
search and capacity-building initiatives over the years. Norway’s 
whole-of-government approach, which combines development with 
security, governance and political objectives, has thus far taken shape 
only in the context of its recent intervention in Afghanistan. Although 
special attention needs to be given to the independence of Norway’s 
civil society, it should also be recognized that this dilemma is, as yet, 
limited to Afghanistan.  
 
In the Afghanistan context, the prominent role of the military in the 
whole-of-government approach is likely to have had an impact on the 
special relationship that traditionally existed between the government 
and its NGO partners. The prominent role of the Norwegian military 
in Afghanistan may have led Norwegian NGOs to prefer to take on a 
more independent identity there – independent from the Norwegian 
government – than has been generally the case. If so, this would be 
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because of concerns that close association with the Norwegian gov-
ernment, and thus Norway’s military participation in Afghanistan as 
part of NATO, could impact negatively on their perceived neutrality 
and impartiality. This is likely to have been the case for those NGOs, 
mostly in the humanitarian domain, for which neutrality and impartial-
ity are core principles. 
 
As a small state, Norway has in the past not been negatively associ-
ated with pursuing major-power national interests. This has made it 
easier for its NGOs and research institutions to be closely linked to the 
Norwegian government without being accused of losing their non-
governmental status. This special identity has also made it easier for 
other humanitarian agencies to engage with Norwegian institutions 
and to receive Norwegian funding. Norway has always been seen as a 
strong supporter of the United Nations, and many Norwegian NGOs 
work closely with the UN, often as implementing partners of its agen-
cies. In Afghanistan, however, Norway’s identity has become more 
complex, because its military role there is undertaken as part of the 
NATO ISAF mission. Norway’s military role in Afghanistan is a 
complex mix of a nationally identified PRT, an association with 
NATO that is emphasized at the operational level, and an association, 
at the strategic level, with the USA and the post-9/11 campaign 
against international terrorism. Norway has become prominently asso-
ciated with NATO and the broader Western coalition, and that erodes 
much of the small-state advantage it could otherwise have had in Af-
ghanistan. This position also negatively affects the degree to which it 
is possible, in the Afghanistan context, to maintain the special rela-
tionship between Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian government.  
3.4 Norwegian Policy Coordination on Afghanistan 
Before the 2005 general elections, the Norwegian government had fo-
cused its efforts on Iraq, and as a result the Norwegian engagement in 
Afghanistan was fragmented and characterized by ad hoc initiatives. 
The new post-2005 Labour coalition government, which replaced a 
Centre/Conservative coalition, decided to shift its focus to UN and 
NATO operations, and to limit its exposure to the coalition operation 
in Iraq.11 The new government decided to expand the use of its armed 
forces in international operations, but emphasized that this should only 
be in international operations undertaken under the UN charter, with a 
UN mandate and in accordance with international law.  
 
Less than two months after the election, the new foreign minister pub-
licly expressed the need to narrow and specialize Norwegian efforts in 
international engagements as an explicit goal, combined with the de-
                                                 
11  The Labour coalition government was re-elected in 2009. 
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sire to improve the UN and its abilities to lead complex operations. 
This meant strengthening Norway’s efforts towards the UN, and UN 
operations, and to a greater extent channelling the country’s stakes in 
international engagements through the UN (Norwegian MFA, 2005). 
Consequently, the new government chose not to extend the Norwegian 
engagement in the US-led operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Iraq, in 
order to shift the focus of the country’s international engagement to 
the operation in Afghanistan.  As a result of these policy changes, 
Norway became a more substantial actor in Afghanistan from 2005 
onwards. Additionally it decided to adopt a whole-of-government ap-
proach to Afghanistan by creating coordination mechanisms between 
the ministries and constructing new interdepartmental arenas, such as 
the Afghanistan Forum, for policymaking.  
 
The State Secretary for Defence, Espen Barth Eide, was formerly the 
head of the Department of International Politics at the Norwegian In-
stitute of International Affairs (NUPI); in that capacity he led a re-
search team that produced a report on the UN’s Integrated Missions 
approach (Eide et al., 2005). On the basis of his knowledge of UN in-
tegration efforts, and the whole-of-government initiatives of countries 
like Canada and the UK, Eide took the lead in initiating the Afghani-
stan Forum as an attempt to establish a Norwegian whole-of-
government approach. The Afghanistan Forum involves meetings, at 
the level of state secretary (similar to deputy minister), that bring to-
gether all the ministries engaged in one form or another in Afghani-
stan, to enable them to pursue a Norwegian whole-of-government ap-
proach towards Afghanistan. 
 
From an international perspective this initiative can be seen as a na-
tional application of the Norwegian call for more integrated and com-
prehensive UN and NATO operations. From the national perspective, 
the Afghanistan Forum can be understood as an initiative to strengthen 
Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan. Before 2005, Norway’s en-
gagement in Afghanistan had been characterized by its sense of duty 
towards its allies, but with the Afghanistan Forum Norway wanted to 
adopt a new coordinated approach based on a comprehensive under-
standing and a common strategy for its involvement in Afghanistan. 
This was confirmed by one of the interviewees from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs who noted, ‘there has been a desire to fulfil political 
goals before the ability to deliver is achieved’, and that many of the 
actors and organizations represented in Afghanistan have acquired ‘a 
strong sense of ownership to their contribution’.  
 
In its present form, the Afghanistan Forum consists of the state secre-
taries from the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), MoD (Ministry of 
Defence), MoJ (Ministry of Justice) and the Office of the Prime Min-
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ister.12 The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul is the Forum’s Afghanistan 
base, with staff from MFA and two persons from the MoD. The Fo-
rum meets at both the political level and the bureaucratic level, as the 
meetings of the state secretaries are supported by corresponding meet-
ings at the ministry level. The bureaucratic level prepares the work of 
the political level. The meetings at the political level are chaired by 
the State Secretary of the MFA, and the Forum has a designated secre-
tariat in the Afghanistan and Pakistan Section of the MFA.  
 
The frequency of these meetings has depended largely on the need for 
policy attention,  since the meetings are aimed at preparing the gov-
ernment to make decisions (‘R-notater’) on Afghanistan. ‘R-notater’ is 
short for Regjeringsnotater: ‘government notes’. All matters requiring 
a formal decision by the government must be submitted in the form of 
a ‘R-notat’, and presented at one of the two weekly government meet-
ings, where binding political decisions are taken. The ‘R-notat’ in-
cludes a presentation of the case, an overview of issues considered by 
the ministry, the minister’s point of view and a recommendation for 
action (Norwegian Office of the Prime Minister, 2003: 15).   
 
The Afghanistan Forum is an opportunity for all the ministries to up-
date and be updated on recent developments in Afghanistan. Apart 
from being the catalyst for the preparation of ‘R-notater’, the main 
ambition is to bring all the relevant actors at the different levels to-
gether. The Forum is meant to serve as a decision-making pipeline on 
Afghanistan related issues. Policy considerations are prepared at the 
bureaucratic level, addressed at the Secretary of State level, where 
recommended actions are formulated, and then submitted to the ex-
ecutive political level for final approval and issuing. The Forum is 
thus meant to create a process whereby the different perspectives from 
the various ministries are integrated and shaped into one coherent 
government approach. A good example is the development and con-
sideration of the Faryab strategy, which was discussed at a Forum 
meeting in March 2009.  
On the other hand, the Forum also exposes the differences among the 
ministries in a way that sometimes causes tension and leads represen-
tatives to take defensive positions. However, in the longer run such 
coordination mechanisms may act to build understanding and respect 
for the mandates, roles and work cultures of the relevant ministries. 
This also seems to be the case, as there appears to be a conscious ef-
fort to learn more about the different roles of the various ministries. 
Staff from the MFA and MoJ has been participating more actively in 
                                                 
12  In addition to its interdepartmental nature, this composition also ensures that the three 
political parties of the governing coalition are represented. 
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military exercises, and each new six-month Norwegian PRT contin-
gent now receives, in addition to their six-month long preparation 
training, a one-day seminar before deployment where representatives 
of the various ministries brief the soldiers on the role and approach of 
their ministry in Afghanistan. Various Norwegian NGOs are also typi-
cally invited to give presentations on their work in Afghanistan at this 
pre-deployment seminar.13 An important effect of the Afghanistan Fo-
rum, and the Norwegian whole-of-government approach in general, is 
that it has created a process that facilitates ongoing attention on Af-
ghanistan, at all levels of the bureaucratic and political hierarchy, and 
across all the relevant ministries.  
3.5 Norwegian Policy Implementation in Afghanistan 
No country operates in a vacuum in Afghanistan. There are a great 
many international actors present in the country; and there are also 
certain structural preconditions for this engagement, such as the or-
ganization of the NATO military activities in Afghanistan in PRTs. 
 
Most of the major international actors are engaged in Afghanistan. 
These include organizations like the UN, NATO, OSCE and EU, and 
countries like the USA, China, Iran, Russia, India and Pakistan – to 
mention only a few. The international intervention in Afghanistan has 
been authorized by the UN Security Council, and currently more than 
100,000 international soldiers from more than 40 different countries 
are deployed in Afghanistan.14 The foundation for Norway’s engage-
ment in Afghanistan is the UN mandate, as per UN Security Council 
resolutions 1386 and 1510, as well as various framework agreements 
like the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS), the Afghanistan Compact, the Paris Declaration, and the 
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board structure (JCMB).  
 
Through the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS, the multilateral and 
bilateral donor community has sought to align its support around Af-
ghan needs and in support of Afghan institutions. However, the gov-
ernment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and promi-
nent critics, have pointed out that the bulk of the international support 
does not flow through the government, but rather through NGOs and 
IOs (See for instance Ghani & Lockhart, 2008). There are in essence 
three different channels for Norwegian aid to Afghanistan. One goes 
directly to GIRoA at the national level. A second goes through IOs 
                                                 
13  This seminar includes presentations both from the military and civilian sector, dealing 
with issues such as  gender perspectives, prison projects, the involvement of the judiciary, 
Norwegian military plans and strategies for the near future, and the organization of NGO 
work and role in Afghanistan.  
14  US troops under Operation Enduring Freedom number approx 30,000; total US troops 
were in October 67,700. See also ISAF’s Facts and Figures :  
http:/www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf 
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and NGOs operating in several parts and sectors in Afghanistan. And 
a third is tied directly to the PRT in Meymaneh and is specifically 
linked to Faryab province. 
3.6 The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Model 
All the countries whose whole-of-government approaches were intro-
duced earlier in this report are deployed in Afghanistan, and all par-
ticipate in, or lead, a specific PRT. The PRT concept is an applied tac-
tical-level whole-of-government approach. Each PRT is encouraged to 
include, in addition to its security (military) element, political advi-
sors, development advisors, police and or rule-of-law advisors, as well 
as any others (like governance, gender, counter-narcotics advisors, 
etc.), as appropriate, depending on the local context of each PRT. The 
PRT concept thus provides for the combined deployment of experts in 
several fields and from a range of government agencies, with the ex-
pectation that their co-location will result in improved whole-of-
government coordination. The end-result is expected to have a more 
system-wide or multi-dimensional impact on the stabilization and re-
construction goals and objectives of the international intervention, 
within each PRT’s area of operation.  
 
The US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition established 
‘Humanitarian Liaison Cells’ in 2002. These were small military 
camps staffed with US military civil affairs specialists, spread across 
the regions of Afghanistan with assessment and implementation tasks 
related to humanitarian and reconstruction needs. These cells evolved 
into what are now known as PRTs, and they became subordinated 
within the ISAF chain of command structure. Although initially meant 
as an interim measure, the PRTs have proved resilient, and there are 
currently 26 of them in Afghanistan.15 The idea was broad and ambi-
tious: the PRTs were to assist the central Afghan government in ex-
tending its authority, and to enable security sector reform and recon-
struction. 
 
Although the initial PRTs were military organizations, most countries, 
in the context of the emerging whole-of-government doctrine, have 
since placed political, developmental and police advisors in their 
PRTs. As these PRTs developed independently at first, and as NATO 
provides for a large degree of national discretion, each country that 
established a PRT was able to determine the composition, goals, ac-
tivities and funding for its own PRT. As a result, most of the 26 PRTs 
are slightly differently organized and each has its own national charac-
ter. They all have a protection (military) component, but the degree to 
                                                 
15  ISAF’s Facts and Figures: 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf 
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which they include civilians, and undertake the originally envisaged 
reconstruction, governance and security sector reform tasks, differs 
widely (Perito, 2005; Eronen, 2008). The PRTs are now better coordi-
nated among themselves than they were in the beginning, and they are 
now part of the overall NATO command and control arrangements.  
  
Norway is the lead nation for the PRT in Meymaneh, in Faryab prov-
ince in the northwest of Afghanistan. Norway was joined by Finland, 
and later also by Latvia and Iceland. Norway has had this lead role 
since September 2005, when it took over from the UK. The PRT 
Meymaneh is organized into two pillars: a civilian group with between 
10 and 20 members, and a military component of around 400 soldiers, 
including 100 from Latvia.16 The PRT is led by a Norwegian Lieuten-
ant Colonel, and it falls under the command of the ISAF Regional 
Command North (RC North). 
 
The PRT is tasked with promoting security and good governance, and 
facilitating development and reconstruction, in close cooperation with 
the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and 
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Support functions for 
the PRT are provided by the Norwegian National Contingent Com-
mand (NCC) and the Norwegian National Support Element (NSE) in 
Mazar-e  Sharif. The NCC acts as a link between the Norwegian units 
in Afghanistan and the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters. 
 
The PRT in Meymaneh maintains a clear distinction between the civil-
ian and military pillars, but they are co-located. In fact, all the civil-
ians have offices in the same building and on the same floor as the 
PRT commander. The ‘civilian PRT’ consisted, in May 2009, of 
around 15 personnel, including a political advisor, three development 
advisors (from Norway, Iceland and Latvia), and police and prison 
advisors. The five Norwegian police officers deployed in Faryab in 
September 2009 were all seconded to the EU police mission (EUPOL-
A). 
 
There is no overall leadership of the civilian part of the PRT. The po-
lice and prison advisors each had a head of contingent, but that only 
amounted to one person being the supervisor of another one. From the 
summer of 2009 a civilian coordinator has been in place, with supervi-
sory responsibility over the Norwegian development and political ad-
visors.17 The civilian coordinator is not responsible for the police and 
                                                 
16  The number of civilians varies somewhat from contingent to contingent. For example, 
more Norwegian police officers came in the autumn of 2009 as part of an expanded 
EUPOL presence.  
17  As of October 2009 the Civilian Coordinator is responsible for one political advisor and 
three development advisors (one Norwegian, one seconded from Iceland and one from 
USAID integrated in the Norwegian team). The Civilian Coordinator reports to the MFA 
via the Norwegian Ambassador in Kabul, but also through formal national lines of report-
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prison advisors, and none of the civilians is answerable to the PRT 
commander on issues other than security and conduct within the 
camp. 
 
There are no Kabul (operational level) or Meymaneh (tactical level) 
whole-of-government fora equivalent to the strategic or political-level 
Afghanistan Forum in Oslo. The military part of the PRT reports di-
rectly through the NCC in Mazar-e Sharif to the Norwegian National 
Joint Headquarters, with no presence at the embassy in Kabul. The 
military attaché at the embassy has other functions and is not part of 
the chain of command of the PRT.  
 
Although there is no formal whole-of-government forum, the military 
team, and the police, prisons, political and development advisors par-
ticipate in a range of meetings aimed at ensuring that their work is 
well coordinated. However, if professional disagreements erupt, and it 
is normal that they do from time to time, it is up to the ability of the 
personnel on the ground to resolve these issues amicably. The Norwe-
gian PRT has no formal procedures for de-conflicting issues in Mey-
maneh. In fact, as of April 2009, the political advisor did not have a 
written job description, even though the post had existed since 2005.18 
If individuals are unable to resolve their differences, they have to 
work the issues up their respective chains of command.  
 
Ultimately, the first joint decision-making level is the Afghanistan Fo-
rum in Oslo. This is not conducive to unity of effort and expeditious 
problem-solving. Current and past PRT personnel interviewed for this 
report indicated that cooperation fluctuated from contingent to contin-
gent, depending on the personalities involved. Whereas the military 
PRT undergoes six months of joint preparation prior to departure for 
Afghanistan in order to establish a unified force, the civilians rotate 
separately from the military, often staying for 12 months or more in 
theatre, and are not involved in the military’s joint preparation period.  
 
Military personnel complained that the civilian side was understaffed 
and that some of the civilians were ‘dogmatic’, because they did not 
allow the soldiers to do simple ‘hearts and minds’ projects.19 Civilians 
in turn complained that the soldiers did not understand development 
practices and should keep their distance. None of the three Norwegian 
political advisors in place between 2005 and 2009 had been regular 
MFA employees prior to taking up their duties in Afghanistan: inter-
nally posted vacancies in the MFA had not yielded any applicants. 
                                                 
ing. The coordinator liaises with ISAF’s PRT office HQ, NATO’s senior civilian repre-
sentative, UNAMA in Mazar-e Sharif and in Kabul, as well as with the local government 
authorities.  
18  Interview with political advisor February 2009. 
19  Interviews with PRT staff in February 2009. 
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The development advisor in 2008/09 also came from outside the MFA 
and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). 
The fact these persons did not come from the line ministries may have 
affected their influence with the military PRT, as well as with the 
MFA and NORAD. The civilians in the Norwegian PRT seemed quite 
junior in terms of rank, compared to the British and Dutch PRTs, and 
they had no clear hierarchical position in relation to the PRT com-
mander. 
 
No PRT in Afghanistan is organized in exactly the same way. In 
Uruzgan province, the Dutch PRT is a substructure of a much larger 
military combat unit, the Task Force Uruzgan. This Dutch PRT is led 
by a military officer with a civilian deputy seconded from the MFA. 
In Helmand province, the British PRT is led by a civilian who also has 
command of some British military personnel. In both these cases, the 
coordinated authority over the work of the PRT resides in the theatre 
of operations. Although many decisions are ultimately taken by the 
various ministries and departments in the home countries, the recom-
mendations are coordinated at the PRT level. In the Norwegian PRT 
there are many stove-piped supervisors, but no overall coordination 
process or leadership. This implies that the Norwegian PRT lacks a 
shared understanding of its tasks, challenges and environment, lacks a 
common plan, common monitoring & evaluation process that can as-
sist it in tracking progress on a whole-of-government basis, and a 
common reporting process (de Coning & Romita, 2009). 
 
The degree to which a coherent Norwegian whole-of-government ap-
proach is applied on the ground, at the tactical level, in Faryab prov-
ince, is therefore the result of the extent to which the shared vision and 
decisions of the state secretaries in the Afghanistan Forum are trans-
mitted, without distortion, through several levels of command in three 
line ministries, down to the PRT advisors in Meymaneh. In fact, the 
situation is even more complex than that. There are several different 
sections in the MFA and NORAD that direct, or otherwise provide 
advice, to the civilian political and development advisors in the PRT, 
via the embassy in Kabul. There are also separate directorates in the 
MoJ that provide guidance and advice to the  police and prisons advi-
sors. On the military side, there are the MoD and the Joint Headquar-
ters to consider, but also the fact that the PRT is made up from a num-
ber of units from the Norwegian Army, Navy and Air Force. These 
services and units have different perspectives and cultures, and that is 
likely to generate variations in the understanding and interpretation of 
the tasking received. If Naval and Army Special Forces become de-
ployed to the PRT, this tendency is likely to be reinforced. 
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Achieving coherence under such circumstances is no mean task. There 
are many layers through which orders or guidance must travel, from 
the state secretaries down to the PRT. Each of these layers can act as a 
prism through which intentions may be interpreted differently and 
possibly become distorted in the process. For the personnel on the 
ground, such distortions are magnified and they can become signifi-
cant obstacles to a common understanding of the instructions received. 
The lack of lower level whole-of-government fora at the Meymaneh 
and Kabul levels may also contribute to gap between Norwegian po-
litical intentions and the realities of the local context. Precisely be-
cause the Afghanistan Forum is so distant from the tactical level, its 
guidance might not being sufficiently adapted to local political and 
cultural realities in Afghanistan.     
3.7 Foreign Policy, Development and Humanitarian 
Policy Action 
Whereas Norway’s military role is focused on the PRT in Meymaneh, 
its foreign policy, development, rule of law and humanitarian policies 
and interventions in Afghanistan have wider ambitions.20 In 
2008/2009Norway contributed NOK 750 million in humanitarian as-
sistance and development support to Afghanistan.21 The MFA, with 
the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, allocated approximately 20% of its 
development and humanitarian budgets to Faryab and 80% to the rest 
of Afghanistan. Most of the Norwegian funds are channelled via the 
World Bank, the UN and international NGOs, especially Norwegian 
ones.  
 
Norway has also placed strong emphasis on maintaining humanitarian 
space for the NGOs. Various sections in the MFA (including its Sec-
tion for Humanitarian Affairs) and the embassy in Kabul are responsi-
ble for how this assistance is used. Much of it is channelled through 
NGOs who perform the humanitarian and development work in Af-
ghanistan under one of the MFAs four priority pillars: village devel-
opment, state-building, good governance and education.  
 
The embassy in Kabul has a coordination role, and administers and 
oversees around 70% of the development and humanitarian assistance 
that Norway allocates to Afghanistan. The funds are distributed 
among UNDP projects, UN humanitarian appeals (OCHA, WFP, 
WHO, FAO), the Norwegian Refugee Council, the ICRC, mine-
                                                 
20  Cf. Norwegian Legal Assistance Afghanistan (NORLAAF) (Styrkebrønnen), 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/tema/Internasjonalt_justissamarbeid/internasjonal-
beredskapsgruppe.html?id=417226  
21   Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Foreign Policy Address to the Storting, 10 
February 2009: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-and-
articles/utenriksministeren/2009/address_storting0902.html?id=545344 
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clearance projects, human rights projects, and others. This way of 
delegating responsibility through the distribution of funds is the result 
of an explicit Norwegian strategy. As one of the interviewees from the 
MFA explained: ‘The NGOs provide the sense of reality, they are the 
eyes and ears of the Ministry.’ The special relationship between the 
Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs is thus maintained as 
far as development and humanitarian assistance are concerned.  
 
There is a considerable difference in focus at the Kabul (operational) 
level and at the Meymaneh level. The embassy in Kabul is responsible 
for implementing the foreign, development and humanitarian policies 
of the Norwegian government throughout Afghanistan, whereas 
Meymaneh is focused on Faryab province and has a significant mili-
tary (security) function, over and above its civilian functions. The em-
bassy is also responsible for engaging with the GIRoA and the inter-
national community, and thus performs the crucial function of ensur-
ing coherence between Norway’s national whole-of-government ap-
proach and the international efforts underway to ensure an interna-
tional comprehensive and integrated approach. 
3.8 Rule of Law and Policing 
The Norwegian MoJ does not have the capacity or the capability to 
administer a police engagement that fully reflects the desires of the 
government for its engagement in Afghanistan. As a matter of general 
policy, the ceiling of the number of Norwegian police officers serving 
abroad at any time is limited to 1% of the total force – which is more 
or less 80 officers.22 The Norwegian Police Force has not been organ-
ized with the aim of deploying police officers abroad, and it does not 
have the same institutional apparatus for this purpose as, for example, 
the military. The executive branch of the MoJ responsible for policing 
is the Police Directorate. This directorate has an office consisting of 
only four officers dealing with recruitment and rotation of all Norwe-
gian police officers worldwide. The demand from the MFA for police 
officers to peace support operations globally is always higher than the 
supply. One of the interviewees from the MoJ explained that the MoJ 
‘cannot meet the current needs from Afghanistan; this is a question of 
capacity’. In Afghanistan the existing Norwegian police contingent is 
spread thinly across a broad range of international policing initiatives. 
One of the results is that the Norwegian government decided that the 
police advisors responsible for mentoring and training in the new 
PMTs (Police Mentoring Teams) would be augmented by Norwegian 
soldiers. This cooperation would seem to be an obvious matching of 
supply and demand. However, it also represents a major break with 
the Norwegian tradition, which until, now has maintained a clear sepa-
                                                 
22  As determined by the Storting (Parliament).  
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ration between the police (considered to be non-combatant civilians 
under International Humanitarian Law), and the military (classified as 
combatants). The arrangement may place both the police and the mili-
tary in tactical situations where there is confusion and uncertainty 
about their respective roles and legal status. In Afghanistan, the Nor-
wegian military personnel are part of NATO and their ability to use 
force is covered by the ISAF Rules of Engagement (ROEs).  The po-
lice advisors are not combatants and will have to comply with the le-
gal framework of law enforcement personnel.  In the report Samarbeid 
eller Samrøre, Halvor Hartz argues that the legal status of the police 
and military members of the PMTs needs to clarified. He offers a pos-
sible scenario where Norwegian police officers will be subject to in-
vestigation and prosecution by Norwegian authorities for the use of 
force in Afghanistan, whereas ISAF members would have immunity 
for the same actions (2009:7). There is also concern that military offi-
cers may be used as mentors for police activities without having the 
required knowledge or experience in police work (ibid: 14–16, 35). 
 
The funding model places most of the power with the MFA. As the 
MFA also controls the budget for the MoJ’s international operations, 
some would say that the Norwegian whole-of-government approach to 
Afghanistan equals MFA policy.23 This is a view shared by many ac-
tors involved with Afghanistan in other agencies than the MFA: for 
instance, a representative of the Norwegian MoJ stated that coordina-
tion is relatively poor and that a ‘part-of-government’ approach would 
be a more precise term.24 
                                                 
23  This is in addition to the fact that the PRT model favours MFAs in determining goals, 
activities and funding.  
24  Interview March 2009 

4. Critical Analysis  
Although the need for an integrated or comprehensive approach is 
widely accepted, many obstacles remain when it comes to implement-
ing the concept in a meaningful way. Most, if not all, actors still fall 
short of their own commitments in this regard. This is because there is 
a significant difference between a policy commitment to the integrated 
or comprehensive approach, and the challenge of navigating the real-
world dilemmas that decision-makers face in trying to coordinate mul-
tiple independent agencies, each directed by their own mandates, gov-
erning bodies and priorities, acting under pressure as a result of lim-
ited resources, limited knowledge and their own time-tables and re-
porting lines. With such constraints and pressures, it is not surprising 
that various studies have found inherent contradictions (Paris & Sisk, 
2009), lack of strategic direction (Smith, 2003) and conflicting aims 
and perspectives (OECD, 2007).25 This remains characteristic of many 
of today’s peace, stability and reconstruction operations, despite sig-
nificant policy-level initiatives to facilitate an integrated or compre-
hensive approach in these missions. Norway’s whole-of-government 
experience in this regard is thus not significantly different from the 
international experience recorded to date. 
4.1 Lack of Strategic Policy Planning 
Despite the leading role it has played in promoting integrated ap-
proaches to international peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, 
Norway does not have a comprehensive strategy for its engagement in 
fragile states in general, nor a whole-of-government strategy for any 
particular country, including Afghanistan. However, in 2009 Norway 
did attempt to develop a strategic vision for its engagement in Faryab 
province (Norwegian MFA, MoD and MoJ, 2009). The Faryab strat-
egy lacks a description of the ground realities that the strategy is in-
tended to deal with, and is more a vision than a plan – but it can offer 
a good starting point. It is indicative of how a more strategic approach 
to Afghanistan can help to direct a more coherent whole-of-
government approach to Afghanistan, as well as other similar country 
initiatives. Different government agencies can be expected to pursue 
coherence if they do not have clear benchmarks for measuring 
                                                 
25  See for instance the report, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States (OECD, 
2007:19) that points out that different actors approach fragile states differently, and may, 
at times, even have conflicting aims and perspectives that are not easily reconciled.  These 
perspectives may range from counter-terrorism to governance, conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding, trade promotion, humanitarian action, reconciliation, and development co-
operation. 
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whether they are acting in coherence with a larger strategy (de Con-
ing, 2007:12).  
 
The reluctance to develop such specific strategies is perhaps sympto-
matic of Norwegian foreign policy in general. Norway has identified 
peace and reconciliation, development, humanitarian aid, support to 
international organizations, human rights and democracy-building as 
key components of its international policies. It has more than tripled 
its development budget since 1990, becoming one of the few countries 
to fulfil the commitment to raise the development assistance contribu-
tion to one per cent of GDP. In the proposed national budget for 2010 
the level of assistance is set to 1.09 per cent of GNI (Norwegian Na-
tional Budget, 2010:13). There is thus no doubt about Norway’s 
commitment to making significant contributions in the areas it has 
chosen to focus on.  
 
However, Norwegian engagements abroad have been characterized by 
ad hoc solutions. Referring to Thune and Ulriksen’s (2002) foreign 
policy analysis discussed earlier, we may say that, as a result of this 
lack of clear strategic planning, Norway’s default foreign policy and 
whole-of-government approach appears to hinge on being recognized 
as a substantial international actor. The Norwegian approach suggests 
that Norway would prefer to focus on how best to make a substantial 
and sustainable contribution to the peace process in Afghanistan, but 
that the lack of a clear strategic planning process has led all agencies 
and levels of government to pursue the safe fall-back, or auto-pilot, 
position: to make Norway look good, and firmly anchor it within mul-
tilateral frameworks like the UN, NATO and the EU. It might be ar-
gued that there is not necessarily a contradiction between these two 
approaches, but if that is the case they at least do not appear to be 
aligned by design. For any shift in this default position to take place, a 
clear and powerful signal will need to be sent from the political lead-
ership down through the bureaucracy. Otherwise the organizations 
will keep on pursuing what they believe to be a continuation of long-
held and valued Norwegian policy.  
 
Most of the examples provided throughout the text contribute to this 
finding, but perhaps the most obvious one relates to the contribution 
of the MoJ in Afghanistan. The limited number of police officers that 
Norway can deploy in Afghanistan – approximately 23 in 2009 – have 
been spread thinly across a broad variety of organizations and pro-
jects.  Nine officers are serving with the EU mission EUPOL-A, four 
are working within the US-led Focus District Development pro-
gramme, one is seconded to the UN mission UNAMA and seven offi-
cers are working bilaterally on various projects, amongst others,  men-
toring the Counter Narcotics Police in Afghanistan and the Female 
Norway’s Whole-of-Government Approach and its Engagement with Afghanistan 39 
Police Project at the Police Academy. An alternative approach could 
have been to focus these Norwegian resources on one, or a few, lim-
ited specific needs-based programmes, so that the investment could 
more readily produce tangible and sustainable results. Instead it would 
appear as if  the Norwegian police advisors have, since the outset in 
2003 and up to date, been randomly deployed – in the words of one 
person interviewed: ‘at a bureaucrat's best guess of what will benefit 
the reputation of Norway in the EU and NATO.’   
4.2 Process vs. Structure 
One strength of the Norwegian whole-of-government approach lies in 
its ad hoc nature that favours process rather than structure. This avoids 
the main unintended consequences of most of the institutional models, 
such as the Canadian START, the US C/SCRS and the UK’s Stabili-
zation Unit. In most, if not all, these cases, the newly established co-
ordination units became part of the coordination problem and bureau-
cratic turf battles, competing for funds, power, influence and prestige 
with the existing departments that they are supposed to coordinate. 
The Norwegian approach, which is to keep coordination separate from 
execution, seems to be optimal for the highly complex and dynamic 
environments in which most peace and stability-type interventions 
take place. 
 
However, too much of an ad hoc nature can be a weakness. Norway’s 
whole-of-government approach seems to be too dependent on the will 
of the sitting government, the goodwill of the current state secretaries 
and the personal chemistry of the personnel in the embassy in Kabul 
and the PRT in Meymaneh. There is no guarantee that a new govern-
ment or new personnel will follow the same system. In this context the 
Swedish, Dutch and Canadian models, where there is a legal or at least 
high-level policy basis for the whole-of-government approach, are to 
be commended. Such a legal or high-level policy basis serves to for-
malize the processes that need to be followed to ensure that a whole-
of-government approach has been integrated into the policy decisions 
that lead to, and sustain, foreign interventions. 
 
The Norway’s whole-of-government approach can also be broadened 
from its current focus on creating a space for sharing information 
through the Afghanistan Forum, to include a formal requirement in 
high-level policy, as in the Canadian and Swedish approaches, that the 
whole-of-government process should develop a national strategy. For 
instance, it could be specified that such a national strategy must be 
preceded by a joint assessment and analysis process involving all the 
relevant governmental departments. The ensuing joint strategy will 
need to include a joint monitoring and evaluation system. Such a sys-
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tem should monitor progress against benchmarks on an ongoing basis, 
and evaluate progress against goals and objectives on a regular basis. 
This will ensure that the coordination process is driven by, and can be 
evaluated against, clear goals and objectives.  
 
These goals and objectives should be broadly defined at the higher 
strategic level, leaving room for operational and tactical flexibility. 
Indeed, part of the strategy should be to remain flexible, and to seek to 
be coherent with Afghan and international strategic frameworks, as 
well as to be responsive to changes in the situation. In that way, the 
strategy would not become locked into a narrowly defined and highly 
detailed national whole-of-government plan, but would be able to con-
sider Norway’s goals and objectives in the context of the dynamic 
situation as well as Afghan and international strategies. 
 
Canada, the UK and others use their whole-of-government approaches 
to coordinate all their international interventions. By contrast, Nor-
way’s approach has been limited to the intervention in Afghanistan. 
The Norwegian whole-of-government approach could be formalized, 
either in a law, or through a high-level policy process, and could be 
applied to all cases where the Norwegian government deployments 
civilians, police and military to international conflict management op-
erations. In the case of Afghanistan, the initiative was initially driven 
by the MoD because of its military deployment, but in other cases 
there may be only civilian and police deployments. The Norwegian 
approach should thus not be dependent on any one ministry, but 
should automatically involve all the ministries that are usually en-
gaged in international deployments, even if they are not engaged in a 
specific case at that point. Such involvement will help them to learn 
lessons from that experience, learn from the process, and be better in-
formed of the situation, should circumstances change and require de-
ployment from that department in future. 
4.3 The Tension between National and International 
Coherence  
Both the international and the Norwegian whole-of-government ex-
periences point to an important tension between national and interna-
tional coherence. If the Norwegian government were to have a de-
tailed nationally developed, nationally driven strategy for Afghani-
stan, it would be limited in the extent to which it could contribute to a 
coherent international approach to Afghanistan. It would be equally 
limited in the extent to which it could align its national interests and 
values to those of the Afghan government and people, because such a 
strategy would, by definition, be driven primarily by Norwegian na-
tional interests and domestic decision-making bodies. This inherent 
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tension can be resolved only if the national strategy is informed by 
extensive international and Afghan consultations and a commitment to 
support, and be coherent with, international and Afghan strategies and 
approaches.  
 
It is thus important to reflect on what should, and should not, be de-
cided upon at the national or whole-of-government level. The objec-
tive of the whole-of-government approach is to harmonize the policy 
actions offered by the various government departments in a given in-
tervention, for instance Afghanistan. One way to do that is to ensure 
that there is a mechanism in place where these various departments 
can meet regularly, exchange information, and discuss cooperation – 
like Norway’s Afghanistan Forum. A more ambitious approach would 
be to seek to develop a national strategy towards, e.g. Afghanistan, so 
that all the departments become linked into pursuing the same objec-
tive. As noted above, several governments, including those of Canada 
and Sweden, have institutionalized this strategy-driven approach. 
Such a strategy approach can be especially useful if it creates a proc-
ess that brings the different departments together in a structured dia-
logue. This will often start with a joint assessment and joint analysis 
process which will result in the departments coming to a shared un-
derstanding of the problem. The next step is a discussion leading to a 
strategy that formulates how Norway can best make a contribution to, 
manage, or resolve the problem at hand. The added value of the 
whole-of-government approach is that this process aims to integrate 
the various dimensions and principles represented by these different 
departments – diplomacy, defence, justice, policing, security, devel-
opment, humanitarian assistance, human rights, etc. 
 
The danger, as highlighted earlier, is that the assessment, analysis and 
planning that follow from such a process could lock the Norwegian 
government, or its respective departments, into a path that is not co-
herent with, for instance, Afghan or international strategies, or that is 
slow to adjust to developments on the ground and in the international 
arena. An alternative approach is deliberately to avoid having an 
overly detailed national plan that might entail lack of flexibility when 
it comes to cooperating with Afghan and international partners. In-
stead, the whole-of-government approach could be limited to formu-
lating broad or higher-level goals and objectives. Of course, it should 
also state a clear commitment to support Afghan and internationally 
agreed frameworks, and a commitment to engage vigorously in shap-
ing such an international strategic framework.   
 
Norway has not developed or chosen the PRT model in Afghanistan, 
but has had to contribute within the structural limitations governing 
the situation, including the requirement of broadly following ISAF’s 
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intentions for the PRTs. To some degree, Norway has been able to in-
fluence its specific approach to the PRT model. The PRT model in 
general, however, is a clear example of the tension between national 
and international approaches, and has contributed to the lack of coher-
ence in Afghanistan. 
 
On the other hand, precisely since Norway values its international 
contribution through the PRT, its only choice is to try, in the short 
term, to contribute to improved coordination within the given struc-
tural limitations, while engaging internationally to find better ways of 
achieving coherence among the international actors in the longer term. 
4.4 The Tension between Strategic and Operational 
Coherence  
The need for strategic guidance at the political level in Oslo has been 
recognized and implemented, through the functioning of the Afghani-
stan Forum at the state-secretary level, but there seems insufficient 
recognition of the need for operational-level coordination in Kabul. 
Head office political functionaries and officials typically cover a range 
of issues at the more strategic level, whereas the officials deployed 
into the theatre of operations have a directed focus on the specific case 
and end to be more engaged in the operational and tactical issues at 
hand. As this is also the case with other countries and international 
organizations, the coordination among international actors in the thea-
tre or at the operational level is a crucial level where those dedicated 
to the specific context can meaningfully engage with each other. It is 
here that the local authorities are present at the highest level, and that 
they can be most meaningfully engaged. 
 
It is thus very useful to have a range of in-country level coordination 
processes where national, international and local stakeholders can 
meet regularly to share information and coordinate action. In the 
whole-of-government context, the ambassador is the natural focal 
point for coordination, and one would expect that he or she would 
regularly convene meetings where the most senior representatives of 
the various government agencies represented at country level would 
meet to coordinate their activities. It is also to be expected that they 
would discuss the issues that need to be referred to the strategic or 
Oslo level, as well as issues be taken up with partners in Kabul and 
elsewhere in Afghanistan. As these various agencies are each net-
worked within their own functional sectors, regularly coming together 
to exchange information would be a useful opportunity for cross-
pollination and triangulation of perspectives across sectors. It was thus 
surprising to learn that such meetings among all the different govern-
ment agencies engaged rarely took place in Afghanistan. 
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It is recommended that Norway, following the Canadian example, in-
clude as part of its whole-of-government approach a specific set of 
policy actions required at the operational or country level. These could 
include an annual national or operational-level action plan, with an 
assessment, an operational action plan, a description of coordination 
mechanisms, and a monitoring and evaluation plan. The ambassador, 
together with the most senior representatives of all the government 
agencies represented in country, should be responsible for developing 
such a plan, which should serve as a living document that is continu-
ously updated as important indicators change.  
 
The national-level plan should be informed by regular consultations 
with Norwegian civil-society organizations working in the country, as 
well as other consultation processes, for instance with an advisory 
panel representing a cross-section of eminent local personalities. The 
operational or country-level plan should both influence and flow from 
Oslo-level strategic guidance. There needs to be a clear time-table for 
submitting an annual review and assessment to Oslo, followed by stra-
tegic guidance from Oslo, and followed by a revised country-level 
plan. In the interim, the country-level forum should report regularly to 
the Oslo-level forum on implementation of the current plan, based on 
the feedback generated by the monitoring and evaluation process. The 
monitoring and evaluation process should track the implementation of 
the whole-of-government strategy and the country plan, as well as 
various country-level indicators independent of the Norwegian strat-
egy.  
 
Neither the Norwegian strategy or operational plan, nor the monitor-
ing and evaluation process, should be so intensive as to hinder or pre-
vent the country-level representatives from participating fully in their 
own functional coordination processes. The whole-of-government co-
ordination process should be intensive enough to inform the Norwe-
gian policy-making process in a meaningful way, but not so intensive 
that it negatively affects Norway’s ability to engage meaningfully 
with other international partners or in-country and local-level coordi-
nation processes. 
4.5 Local Context and Local Ownership 
One of the most persistent criticisms levelled against ambitious initia-
tives intended to promote coherence among external actors is the view 
that this amounts to a ‘ganging-up’ of the international community, 
with the domestic actors forced to deal with positions pre-agreed 
among the external actors. Such an approach is not conducive to dia-
logue among partners, nor does it encourage local ownership and the 
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contextualization of responses to local needs, priorities and the local 
social-cultural environment. In its whole-of-government approach, 
Norway should make special efforts to remain sensitive to the local 
context, aligned with local needs and visions – especially in the post-
conflict peacebuilding phase, where such visions are typically formu-
lated in a country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or simi-
lar frameworks, like the Afghan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS) in the Afghanistan context. 
 
One of the ways in which Norway can encourage local contextualiza-
tion in the context of a whole-of-government approach is to establish, 
at the embassy level, an advisory body made up of a representative 
cross-section of members of the local cultural, social, financial and 
academic community. Such an advisory body can be convened per-
haps twice a year, and consulted on Norway’s strategy and plans in 
the country, including on its assessment of progress. It could also play 
a role in advising the Norwegian ambassador on developmental and 
related projects being considered for support, if only at the generic or 
abstract level. At the very least such a body would provide Norway 
with the opportunity to engage with local opinion-makers in a struc-
tured and systematic way, enabling it to air some of its assessments 
and assumptions to leading figures in the local community. 
4.6 Relationship with Norwegian Civil Society 
Norway’s special relationship with civil society has several advan-
tages for its whole-of-government approach. First, it can provide the 
country with flexibility to adapt relatively easily to a changing situa-
tion; second, it enables maximizing the range of engagement so that 
Norway can be involved in a wide range of international processes; 
third, it can serve as a way for the government to maintain the hu-
manitarian space – as in Afghanistan.  
 
However, there is a danger that the whole-of-government approach 
may negatively impact on this special relationship. The special rela-
tionship between the Norwegian government and civil society has tra-
ditionally operated in the context of the developmental and humanitar-
ian dimensions of Norwegian foreign policy, including its relationship 
with the UN – generally uncontroversial, and broadly supported by all 
segments of the Norwegian population.  
 
More recently, Norway’s post-9/11 military operations, especially the 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the linkages with the inter-
national war on terror and the unpopularity of the Bush administra-
tion, have been controversial in Norway and abroad. The fall-out from 
these operations, and the general policy followed by the humanitarian 
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community of maintaining a clear distinction between humanitarian 
and military identities, roles and responsibilities, are may well lead 
Norway’s NGO and research community to feel less comfortable 
about being closely associated with their country’s foreign policy, if 
this is seen as closely integrated with a Norwegian military presence.  
 
In other words, if the whole-of-government model means that Norwe-
gian NGOs will have to deal with a Norwegian development advisor 
embedded in a Norwegian/NATO PRT, and if that involves frequent 
official visits to the PRT compound, or other frequent and public as-
sociations with the Norwegian/NATO military, Norwegian NGOs are 
likely to develop other ways of liaising with such development advi-
sors, and will seek to limit their openly visible association with the 
Norwegian/NATO military presence. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and all the agencies involved in the 
whole-of-government approach, should engage with the Norwegian 
NGO and research community, and openly discuss the Norwegian 
whole-of-government approach, and how that may impact on the spe-
cial relationship between the Norwegian government and civil society. 
A forum could be established where Norwegian civil society, recog-
nized as a key partner in achieving Norway’s foreign policy, espe-
cially its developmental and humanitarian objectives, can regularly 
engage with each other on issues related to Norway’s international 
operations and its whole-of-government approach to these. Such a fo-
rum could be replicated at the embassy level, so that the Norwegian 
ambassador and other government agencies represented at the in-
country level may regularly engage with Norwegian NGOs active in 
that country, and discuss issues of common concern. Such organized 
discussions can create the space for a positively critical analysis of 
Norway’s foreign policy and whole-of-government approach in gen-
eral, or in a particular country. They can provide both the Norwegian 
government and Norwegian civil society with useful information 
about each other’s policies, actions and perspectives – offering to both 
an opportunity to harmonize and align their policies accordingly. 

5. Conclusion 
This report has sought to address the lack of information available, in 
Norway and internationally, on the Norwegian whole-of-government 
approach, and to make a first attempt at analysing its effectiveness. 
We have focused extensively on Norway’s engagement with Afghani-
stan, because Norway has developed and applied its whole-of-
government approach exclusively in connection with its engagement 
there.  
 
The rationale for a national whole-of-government approach is greater 
effectiveness. It is driven by the assumption that a government’s for-
eign engagements will have a more meaningful and sustainable impact 
when the various government departments involved pursue a common 
strategy, have a shared understanding of the problem, a common the-
ory of change, and an agreed plan for implementing such a strategy. 
 
We have found that Norway lacks a comprehensive strategy for en-
gaging in fragile states in general, as well as a whole-of-government 
strategy for any particular country –  including Afghanistan. As a re-
sult, Norwegian engagements abroad have been characterized by ad 
hoc solutions. The lack of clear strategic direction often results in 
people at the operational and tactical levels falling back to the default 
position, i.e. making Norway look good and firmly anchoring Norway 
within multilateral frameworks like the UN, NATO and the EU. This 
report recommends that Norway consider adopting a law, or high-
level policy document, that integrates the whole-of-government ap-
proach into the working methodology of government. Such a law or 
policy could make it a requirement for Norway to have a national 
whole-of-government policy towards every country where it is en-
gaged in initiatives related to peacekeeping, peacebuilding or conflict 
resolution. 
 
In order to avoid possible tensions between a whole-of-government 
approach and country-specific integrated strategic frameworks, Nor-
way’s goals and objectives should be broadly defined at the higher 
strategic level. Focusing on the strategic level should leave sufficient 
room for operational and tactical flexibility for Norway to pursue co-
herence with local and international strategic frameworks, while also 
remaining flexible to changes in the situation on the ground.  
 
A unique characteristic of the Norwegian model is the special rela-
tionship between the Norwegian government and Norwegian civil so-
Cedric de Coning, Helge Lurås, Niels Nagelhus Schia and Ståle Ulriksen 48 
ciety. This report has expressed concern about the negative effects a 
Norwegian whole-of-government approach might have on this rela-
tionship. We recommend that a forum be established where Norwe-
gian civil society and government can regularly engage each other on 
issues related to the country’s international engagements, and its 
whole-of-government approach. Such a forum could be replicated at 
the embassy level, so that the Norwegian ambassador and other gov-
ernment agencies represented at the in-country level could regularly 
engage with Norwegian NGOs active in that country, to discuss issues 
of common concern. Such organized discussions can create the space 
for positive, critical analysis of Norway’s foreign policy and whole-
of-government approach in general, or in a particular country, and 
provide both the Norwegian government and Norwegian civil society 
with useful information about each other’s policies, actions and per-
spectives, thereby providing both with an opportunity to harmonize 
and align their policies accordingly. 
 
The need for an integrated or comprehensive approach is widely ac-
cepted, but many obstacles remain when it comes to implementing the 
concept in a meaningful way, and most (if not all) actors still fall short 
of their own commitments in this regard. This is because there is a 
significant difference between a policy commitment to an integrated 
or comprehensive approach, and the challenge of navigating the real-
world dilemmas that decision-makers face in trying to coordinate mul-
tiple independent agencies, each directed by their own mandates, gov-
erning bodies and priorities, acting under pressure as a result of lim-
ited resources, limited knowledge and their own time-tables and re-
porting lines.  
 
Given such constraints and pressures, it is not surprising that various 
studies have found inherent contradictions, a lack of strategic direc-
tion, and conflicting aims and perspectives. Despite the significant 
policy-level initiatives undertaken to facilitate an integrated or com-
prehensive approach in such missions, this remains characteristic – not 
only of Norway’s engagements, but indeed of most peace, stability 
and reconstruction operations today.  
 
Bibliography 
Christensen T. & P. Lægreid, 2006, The Whole-of-Government Ap-
proach – Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform, 
Stein Rokkan Center for Social Studies, Working Paper 6, Unifob, 
Bergen.   
Collier, P.; V.L. Elliot, H. Hegre, A. Hoefller, M. Reynal Querol, & 
N. Sambanis. 2003, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and 
Development Policy, Oxford University Press and the World 
Bank, New York. 
de Coning, C.H., 2007, Coherence and Coordination in United Na-
tions Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Per-
spective, Security in Practice No.5, Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (NUPI), December 2007, Oslo. 
de Coning, C.H., 2008, The United Nations and the Comprehensive 
Approach, DIIS Report 2008:14, Copenhagen. 
de Coning, C.H. & P. Romita, 2009, Monitoring and Evaluation of 
Peace Operations, International Peace Institute, New York, and 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. 
Edström, H. (ed.), 2009, Approaching Comprehensiveness: Two 
Grand Strategic Options and Some of their Consequences, Nor-
wegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo Files on Defence and 
Security 3/2009, Oslo. 
Egeland, J., 1988, Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State: Poten-
tials and Limitations of Human Rights Objectives in the Foreign 
Policies of the United States and Norway, Norwegian University 
Press, Oslo. 
Eide, E. B.; A.T. Kaspersen, R. Kent, & K. v. Hippel., 2005, Report 
on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommenda-
tions, NUPI, Oslo 
Eronen, O., 2008, PRT Models in Afghanistan Approaches to Civil–
Military Integration, Civilian Crisis Management Studies, Vol. 1, 
No. 5, CMC Finland, Kuopio. 
Friis, K. & P. Jarmyr, 2008, Comprehensive Approach: Challenges 
and Opportunities in Complex Crisis Management, NUPI Security 
in Practice No. 11, Oslo. 
Fukuyama, F., 2004, State-Building: Governance and World Order in 
the 21st Century, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Ghani, A. & C. Lockhart, 2008, Fixing Failed States: A Framework 
for Rebuilding a Fractured World, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford.  
Cedric de Coning, Helge Lurås, Niels Nagelhus Schia and Ståle Ulriksen 50 
Gross, E., 2008, The EU and the Comprehensive Approach, DIIS Re-
port 2008:13, Copenhagen. 
Græger, N. 2007, Norsk forsvarsdiskurs 1990-2005: Internasjonalise-
ring av forsvaret: Universitetet i Oslo, Institutt for Statsvitenskap. 
Oslo 
Græger, N. 2009, Norsk forsvarsdiskurs post-1990., Internasjonal Po-
litikk, vol. 67, nr. 3  Universitetsforlaget.Oslo. 351-380. 
Hartz, H. 2009, Samarbeid eller samrøre: norsk politi og militære 
sammen om politiopplæring i Afghanistan, NUPI Working Paper 
764, Oslo. 
Jakobsen, P.V., 2008, A Work in Slow Progress: NATO’s Comprehen-
sive Approach to Crisis Response Operations, DIIS Report 
2008:15, Copenhagen. 
Leira, H.; A. Borchgrevink, N. Græger, A. Melchior, E. Stamnes & I. 
Øverland, 2007, Norske selvbilder og norsk utenrikspolitikk, NUPI 
report, Oslo.  
Lunde, L. & H. Thune, 2008, Norske interesser – utenrikspolitikk for 
en globalisert verden, Cappelen Damm, Oslo. 
Mann, E. C. & S. Endersby, 2002, Thinking Effects – Effects-Based 
Methodology for Joint Operations. USAF Air University Maxwell 
Air Force Base, Center for Aerospace Doctrine Research and Edu-
cation, Montgomery, AL. 
MNE, 2008, Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and 
Evaluation – Outline Concept Version 2.0, MNE 5 – US Joint 
Forces Command, Norfolk, VA.  
NATO, 2007a, Engagement Space Assessment Handbook, NATO HQ 
SACT, Norfolk, VA. 
NATO, 2007b, Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) Hand-
book, Brussels. 
Neumann, I. B., 2003, Hva så, lille land? Essays om Norges alminne-
lighet, Spartacus, Oslo. 
Nilsson, C.; C. Hull, M. Derblom & R. Egnell, 2008, Contextualising 
the Comprehensive Approach: The Elements of a Comprehensive 
Approach Intervention, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 
Stockholm. 
Norwegian MFA, 2005, Redegjørelse om Norges engasjement i Af-
ghanistan: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/utenriks
ministeren/2005/redegjorelse-om-norges-engasjement-i-
afg.html?id=273193 
Norwegian MFA, 2008, Norge i Fredens tjeneste – Norske bidrag til 
fred og forsoning: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rapport
er/2000/fredenstjeneste.html?id=467585#modell 
Norwegian MFA, MoD and MoJ., 2009, Strategi for helhetlig norsk 
sivil og militær innsats i Faryab-provinsen i Afghanistan, Oslo.  
Norway’s Whole-of-Government Approach and its Engagement with Afghanistan 51 
Norwegian National Budget, 2010,   
http://www.statsbudsjettet.dep.no/upload/Statsbudsjett_2010/doku
menter/pdf/summary_national%20_budget_2010.pdf 
Norwegian Office of the Prime Minister, 2003, Om Regjeringskonfer-
anse: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/smk/bro/2003/0001/ddd/p
dfv/169883-innmat_r-notat.pdf 
OECD, 2003, ‘Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development’, 
OECD Observer, July, OECD, Paris. 
OECD, 2005, Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guide-
lines and Reference Series, OECD, Paris. 
OECD, 2006, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States, 
OECD, Paris. 
OECD, 2007, Guidance on the Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding Activities, OECD, Paris. 
Patrick, S. & K. Brown, 2007, Greater than the Sum of its Parts: As-
sessing ‘Whole-of-Government’ Approaches to Fragile States, In-
ternational Peace Academy, New York. 
Paris, R. & T. D. Sisk, 2009, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Con-
fronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations. Security 
and Governance Series, Routledge, London.  
Perito, R. M., 2005, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Teams in Afghanistan – Lessons Identified. United States In-
stitute of Peace, Washington DC. 
Rintakoski, K. & M. Autti, 2008, Comprehensive Approach: Trends, 
Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention 
and Management, Seminar Report from the Comprehensive Ap-
proach Seminar held on 17 June 2008 in Helsinki. Crisis Man-
agement Initiative, Helsinki. 
Smith, D., 2003, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: 
the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding, 
PRIO, Oslo. 
Suhrke, A. & I. Samset,  2007, ‘What’s in a Figure? Estimating Re-
currence of Civil War’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 
2, 195–203. 
Thune, H. & S. Ulriksen. 2002, ‘Prestige and Penance through Peace. 
Norway as an Allied Activist’, in Ann-Sofie Dahl & Norman Hilmer 
(eds) Activism and (Non)Alignment: The Relationship Between For-
eign Policy and Security Doctrine. Conference Papers 31, Utri-
kespolitiska institutet, Stockholm. and NUPI Working Paper 637, 
2002 
Tvedt, T., 2003, Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt: den norske 
modellen, Gyldendal akademisk, Oslo. 
Ulriksen, S., 2002,  Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: militærmakt eller 
folkeforsvar?  Makt- og globaliseringsutredningen, Pax forlag, Oslo. 
Cedric de Coning, Helge Lurås, Niels Nagelhus Schia and Ståle Ulriksen 52 
Ulriksen, S., 2007a, ‘Brydningstid – paradigmeskiftet i det norske 
forsvar (2001–2005)’ in Bertel Heurlin (ed.), Nationen eller 
Verden – de nordiske landes forsvar i dag, Jurist- og Økonom-
forbundets Forlag, Copenhagen. 
Ulriksen, S., 2007b, ‘Deployments for Development? Nordic 
Peacekeeping Efforts in Africa’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 
14, No. 4. 553-568. 
UN, 2005, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and 
Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, United Nations, New York. 
UN, 2006a, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 9 February 
2006, United Nations, New York. 
UN, 2006b, Delivering as One, Report of the Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence, United Nations, 
New York. 
UN, 2006c, Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines 
endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006, United Na-
tions, New York. 
 
